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Concurrent learning-based online approximate
feedback-Nash equilibrium solution of N -player
nonzero-sum differential games
Rushikesh Kamalapurkar, Justin Klotz, and Warren E. Dixon
Abstract—This paper presents a concurrent learning-based
actor-critic-identifier architecture to obtain an approximate
feedback-Nash equilibrium solution to an infinite horizon N -
player nonzero-sum differential game online, without requiring
persistence of excitation (PE), for a nonlinear control-affine
system. Under a condition milder than PE, uniformly ultimately
bounded convergence of the developed control policies to the
feedback-Nash equilibrium policies is established.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various control problems can be modeled as multi-input
systems, where each input is computed by a player, and each
player attempts to influence the system state to minimize its
own cost function. In this case, the optimization problem for
each player is coupled with the optimization problem for other
players. In general, an optimal solution in the usual sense
does not exist; and hence, alternative criteria for optimality
are sought.
Differential game theory provides solution concepts for
multi-player, multi-objective optimization problems [1]–[3].
For example, a set of policies is called a Nash equilibrium
solution to a multi-objective optimization problem if none of
the players can improve their outcome by changing their policy
if all the other players abide by the Nash equilibrium policies
[4]. The Nash equilibrium provides a secure set of strategies, in
the sense that none of the players have an incentive to diverge
from their equilibrium policy. Hence, Nash equilibrium has
been a widely used solution concept in differential game-based
control techniques.
In general, Nash equilibria are not unique. For a closed-loop
differential game (i.e., the control is a function of the state
and time) with perfect information (i.e. all the players know
the complete state history), there can be infinitely many Nash
equilibria. However, if the policies are constrained to be feed-
back policies, the resulting equilibria are called (sub)game-
perfect-Nash equilibria or feedback-Nash equilibria. The value
functions corresponding to feedback-Nash equilibria satisfy a
coupled system of Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations [5]–[8].
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If the system dynamics are nonlinear and uncertain, an
analytical solution of the coupled HJ equations is generally
infeasible. Hence, dynamic programming-based approximate
solutions are sought [9]–[14]. In [13], an integral reinforce-
ment learning algorithm is presented to solve nonzero-sum
differential games in linear systems without the knowledge
of the drift matrix. In [14], a dynamic programming-based
technique is developed to find an approximate feedback-Nash
equilibrium solution to an infinite horizon N -player nonzero-
sum differential game online for nonlinear control-affine sys-
tems with known dynamics. In [15], a policy iteration-based
method is used to solve a two-player zero-sum game online
for nonlinear control-affine systems without the knowledge of
drift dynamics.
The methods in [14] and [15] solve the differential game
online using a parametric function approximator such as a
neural network (NN) to approximate the value functions. Since
the approximate value functions do not satisfy the coupled
HJ equations, a set of residual errors (the so-called Bellman
errors (BEs)) is computed along the state trajectories and
is used to update the estimates of the unknown parameters
in the function approximator using least-squares or gradient-
based techniques. Similar to adaptive control, a restrictive
persistence of excitation (PE) condition is then used to ensure
boundedness and convergence of the value function weights.
An ad-hoc exploration signal is added to the control signal
during the learning phase to satisfy the PE condition along
the system trajectories [16]–[18].
Based on the ideas in recent concurrent learning-based
results in adaptive control such as [19] and [20] which show
that a concurrent learning-based adaptive update law can
exploit recorded data to augment the adaptive update laws to
establish parameter convergence under conditions milder than
PE, this paper extends the work in [14] and [15] to relax the
PE condition. In this paper, a concurrent learning-based actor-
critic architecture (cf. [21]) is used to obtain an approximate
feedback-Nash equilibrium solution to an infinite horizon N -
player nonzero-sum differential game online, without requiring
PE, for a nonlinear control-affine system.
The solutions to the coupled HJ equations and the cor-
responding feedback-Nash equilibrium policies are approx-
imated using parametric universal function approximators.
Using the known system dynamics, the Bellman errors are
evaluated at a set of preselected points in the state-space. The
value function and the policy weights are updated using a
concurrent learning-based least squares approach to minimize
the instantaneous BEs and the BEs evaluated at preselected
points. It is shown that under a condition milder than PE,
uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence of the value
function weights and the policy weights to their true values
can be established.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND EXACT SOLUTION
Consider a class of control-affine multi-input systems
x˙ = f (x) +
N∑
i=1
gi (x) uˆi, (1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state and uˆi ∈ Rmi are the con-
trol inputs (i.e. the players). In (1), the functions gi :
R
n → Rn×mi are known, uniformly bounded, and lo-
cally Lipschitz, the function f : Rn → Rn is known
and f (0) = 0. Let U , {{ui : Rn → Rmi , i = 1, .., N} |
The tuple {ui, .., uN} is admissible w.r.t. (1)} be the set of
admissible tuples of feedback policies. Let V {ui,..,uN}i : Rn →
R≥0 denote the value function of the ith player w.r.t. the tuple
of feedback policies {u1, .., uN} ∈ U , defined as
V
{u1,..,uN}
i (xo) =
∞ˆ
to
ri (x (τ) , ui (x (τ)) , .., uN (x (τ))) dτ,
(2)
where x (τ) for τ ∈ R≥0 denotes the trajectory of (1)
obtained using the feedback policies uˆi (τ) = ui (x (τ)) and
the initial condition x (to) = xo. In (2), ri : Rn × Rm1 ×
· · · × RmN → R≥0 denote the instantaneous costs defined
as ri (x, ui, .., uN) , x
TQix +
∑N
j=1 u
T
j Rijuj , where Qi ∈
R
n×n are positive definite matrices. The control objective is
to find an approximate feedback-Nash equilibrium solution to
the infinite horizon regulation differential game online, i.e., to
find a tuple {u∗1, .., u∗N} ∈ U such that for all i ∈ {1, .., N},
for all xo ∈ Rn, the corresponding value functions satisfy
V ∗i (xo) , V
{u∗
1
,u∗
2
,..,u∗
i
,..,u∗
N
}
i (xo) ≤ V {u
∗
1
,u∗
2
,..,ui,..,u
∗
N
}
i (xo)
for all ui such that {u∗1, u∗2, .., ui, .., u∗N} ∈ U .
The exact closed-loop feedback-Nash equilibrium solution
{u∗i , .., u∗N} can be expressed in terms of the value functions
as [3], [6], [7], [14]
u∗i = −
1
2
R−1ii g
T
i (∇xV ∗i )T , (3)
assuming that the solutions {V ∗1 , .., V ∗N} to the coupled
Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations
xTQix+
N∑
j=1
1
4
∇xV ∗j Gij
(∇xV ∗j )T +∇xV ∗i f
− 1
2
∇xV ∗i
N∑
j=1
Gj
(∇xV ∗j )T = 0 (4)
exist and are continuously differentiable. In (4), Gj ,
gjR
−1
jj g
T
j and Gij , gjR−1jj RijR
−1
jj g
T
j . The HJ equations in
(4) are in the so-called closed-loop form; they can also be
expressed in an open-loop form as
xTQix+
N∑
j=1
u∗Tj Riju
∗
j+∇xV ∗i f+∇xV ∗i
N∑
j=1
gju
∗
j = 0. (5)
III. APPROXIMATE SOLUTION
Computation of an analytical solution to the coupled non-
linear HJ equations in (4) is, in general, infeasible. Hence,
an approximate solution
{
Vˆ1, .., VˆN
}
is sought. Based on{
Vˆ1, .., VˆN
}
, an approximation {uˆi, .., uˆN} to the closed-
loop feedback-Nash equilibrium solution is determined. Since
the approximate solution, in general, does not satisfy the HJ
equations, a set of residual errors (the so-called Bellman errors
(BEs)) is computed as
δi = x
TQix+
N∑
j=1
uˆTj Rij uˆj +∇xVˆif +∇xVˆi
N∑
j=1
gjuˆj , (6)
and the approximate solution is recursively improved to drive
the BEs to zero.
A. Value function approximation
Using the universal approximation property of NNs, the
value functions can be represented as
V ∗i (x) = W
T
i σi (x) + ǫi (x) , (7)
where Wi ∈ RpWi denote constant vectors of unknown NN
weights, σi : Rn → RpWi denote the known NN activation
functions, pWi ∈ N denote the number of hidden layer
neurons, and ǫi : Rn → R denote the unknown function
reconstruction errors. The universal function approximation
property guarantees that over any compact domain C ⊂ Rn,
for all constant ǫi, ǫ′i > 0, there exists a set of weights and
basis functions such that ‖Wi‖ ≤ W , supx∈C ‖σi (x)‖ ≤
σi, supx∈C ‖σ′i (x)‖ ≤ σ′i, supx∈C ‖ǫi (x)‖ ≤ ǫi and
supx∈C ‖ǫ′i (x)‖ ≤ ǫ′i, where W i, σi, σ′i, ǫi, ǫ′i ∈ R are positive
constants. Based on (3) and (7), the feedback-Nash equilibrium
solutions are
u∗i (x) = −
1
2
R−1ii g
T
i (x)
(
σ′Ti (x)Wi + ǫ
′T
i (x)
)
. (8)
The NN-based approximations to the value functions and
the controllers are defined as
Vˆi , Wˆ
T
ciσi, uˆi , −
1
2
R−1ii g
T
i σ
′T
i Wˆai, (9)
where Wˆci ∈ RpWi , i.e., the value function weights, and
Wˆai ∈ RpWi , i.e., the policy weights, are the estimates of the
ideal weights Wi. The use of two different sets of estimates to
approximate the same set of ideal weights is motivated by the
subsequent stability analysis and the fact that it facilitates an
approximation of the BEs that is affine in the value function
weights, enabling least squares-based adaptation. Based on (9),
measurable approximations to the BEs in (6) are developed as
δˆi = ω
T
i Wˆci + x
TQix +
N∑
j=1
1
4
WˆTajσ
′
jGijσ
′T
j Wˆaj , (10)
where ωi , σ′if − 12
∑N
j=1 σ
′
iGjσ
′T
j Wˆaj . The following as-
sumption, which in general is weaker than the PE assumption,
is required for convergence of the concurrent learning-based
value function weight estimates.
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ {1, .., N}, there exists a finite
set of Mxi points {xij ∈ Rn | j = 1, ..,Mxi} such that for all
t ∈ R≥0,
rank
(
Mix∑
k=1
ωki (t)
(
ωki
)T
(t)
ρki (t)
)
= pWi ,
cxi ,
(
inft∈R≥0
(
λmin
{∑Mxi
k=1
ωk
i
(t)ωkT
i
(t)
ρk
i
(t)
}))
Mxi
> 0, (11)
where λmin denotes the minimum eigenvalue, and cxi ∈
R are positive constants. In (11), ωki (t) , σ′iki f ik −
1
2
∑N
j=1 σ
′ik
i G
ik
j
(
σ′ikj
)T
Wˆaj (t) and ρki , 1+νi
(
ωki
)T
Γiω
k
i ,
where the superscripts ik indicate that the terms are evaluated
at x = xik .
The concurrent learning-based least-squares update laws for
the value function weights are designed as
˙ˆ
Wci = −ηc1iΓiωi
ρi
δˆi − ηc2iΓi
Mxi
Mxi∑
k=1
ωki
ρki
δˆki ,
Γ˙i =
(
βiΓi − ηc1iΓiωiω
T
i
ρ2i
Γi
)
1{‖Γi‖≤Γi}, ‖Γi (t0)‖ ≤ Γi,
(12)
where ρi , 1 + νiωTi Γiωi, 1{·} denotes the indicator func-
tion, Γi > 0 ∈ R are the saturation constants, βi ∈ R
are the constant positive forgetting factors, ηc1i, ηc2i ∈ R
are constant positive adaptation gains, and the approximate
BEs δˆki are defined as δˆki ,
(
ωki
)T
Wˆci + x
T
ikQixik +∑N
j=1
1
4Wˆ
T
ajσ
′ik
j G
ik
ij
(
σ′ikj
)T
Wˆaj .
The policy weight update laws are designed based on the
subsequent stability analysis as
˙ˆ
Wai = −ηa1i
(
Wˆai − Wˆci
)
− ηa2iWˆai
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
ηc1iσ
′
jGijσ
′T
j Wˆ
T
aj
ωTi
ρi
WˆTci
+
1
4
Mxi∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
ηc2i
Mxi
σ′ikj G
ik
ij
(
σ′ikj
)T
WˆTaj
(
ωki
)T
ρki
WˆTci , (13)
where ηa1i, ηa2i ∈ R are positive constant adaptation gains and
Gσi , σ
′
igiR
−1
ii g
T
i σ
′T
i ∈ RpWi×pWi . The forgetting factors
βi along with the saturation in the update laws for the least
squares gain matrices in (12) ensure (cf. [22]) that the least
squares gain matrices Γi and their inverses are positive definite
and bounded for all i ∈ {1, .., N} as
Γi ≤ ‖Γi (t)‖ ≤ Γi, ∀t ∈ R≥0, (14)
where Γi ∈ R are positive constants, and the normalized
regressors are bounded as
∥∥∥ωiρi
∥∥∥ ≤ 1
2
√
νiΓi
.
IV. STABILITY ANALYSIS
Subtracting (4) from (10), the approximate BEs can be
expressed in an unmeasurable form as
δˆi = −ωTi W˜ci +
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜Tajσ
′
jGijσ
′T
j W˜aj
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
WTi σ
′
iGj −WTj σ′jGij
)
σ′Tj W˜aj − ǫ′if +∆i,
(15)
where ∆i , 12
∑N
j=1
(
WTi σ
′
iGj −WTj σ′jGij
)
ǫ′Tj +
1
2
∑N
j=1W
T
j σ
′
jGjǫ
′T
i +
1
2
∑N
j=1 ǫ
′
iGjǫ
′T
j −
∑N
j=1
1
4ǫ
′
jGijǫ
′T
j .
Similarly, the approximate BEs evaluated at the selected
points can be expressed in an unmeasurable form as
δˆki = −ωkTi W˜ci +
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜Tajσ
′ik
j G
ik
ij
(
σ′ikj
)T
W˜aj +∆
k
i
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
WTi σ
′ik
i G
ik
j −WTj σ′ikj Gikij
) (
σ′ikj
)T
W˜aj , (16)
where the constants ∆ki ∈ R are defined as ∆ki , −ǫ′iki f ik +
∆iki . To facilitate the stability analysis, a candidate Lyapunov
function is defined as
VL =
N∑
i=1
V ∗i +
1
2
N∑
i=1
W˜TciΓ
−1
i W˜ci +
1
2
N∑
i=1
W˜TaiW˜ai (17)
Since V ∗i are positive definite, the bound in (14) and Lemma
4.3 in [23] can be used to bound the candidate Lyapunov
function as
v (‖Z‖) ≤ VL (Z, t) ≤ v (‖Z‖) , (18)
where Z =
[
xT , W˜Tc1, .., W˜
T
cN , W˜
T
a1, .., W˜
T
aN
]T
∈
R
2n+2N
∑
i
pWi and v, v : R≥0 → R≥0 are class K
functions. For any compact set Z ⊂ R2n+2N
∑
i
pWi , define
ι1 , max
i,j
(
sup
Z∈Z
∥∥∥∥12WTi σ′iGjσ′Tj + 12ǫ′iGjσ′Tj
∥∥∥∥
)
ι2 , max
i,j
(
sup
Z∈Z
∥∥∥ηc1iωi
4ρi
(
3Wjσ
′
jGij − 2WTi σ′iGj
)
σ′Tj
+
Mxi∑
k=1
ηc2iω
k
i
4Mxiρki
(
3WTj σ
′ik
j G
ik
ij − 2WTi σ′iki Gikj
) (
σ′ikj
)T∥∥∥)
ι3 , max
i,j
(
sup
Z∈Z
∥∥∥1
2
N∑
i,j=1
(
WTi σ
′
i + ǫ
′
i
)
Gjǫ
′T
j
−1
4
N∑
i,j=1
(
2WTj σ
′
j + ǫ
′
j
)
Gijǫ
′T
j
∥∥∥)
ι4 , max
i,j
(
sup
Z∈Z
∥∥σ′jGijσ′Tj ∥∥
)
, ι5i ,
ηc1iLfǫ
′
i
4
√
νiΓi
ι8 ,
N∑
i=1
(ηc1i + ηc2i)W iι4
8
√
νiΓi
, ι9i ,
(
ι1N + (ηa2i + ι8)W i
)
ι10i ,
ηc1i supZ∈Z ‖∆i‖+ ηc2imaxk
∥∥∆ki ∥∥
2
√
νiΓi
vl ,
1
2
min
(
qi
2
,
ηc2icxi
4
,
2ηa1i + ηa2i
8
)
ι ,
N∑
i=1
(
2ι29i
2ηa1i + ηa2i
+
ι210i
ηc2icxi
)
+ ι3,
Z , v−1
(
v
(
max
(
‖Z (t0)‖ ,
√
ι
vl
)))
(19)
where qi denote the minimum eigenvalues of Qi and the
suprema exist since ωi
ρi
are uniformly bounded for all Z ,
and the functions Gi, Gij , σ′i, and ǫ′i are continuous. In
(19), Lf ∈ R≥0 denotes the Lipschitz constant such that
‖f (̟)‖ ≤ Lf ‖̟‖ for all ̟ ∈ Z ∩ Rn. The sufficient
conditions for UUB convergence are derived based on the
subsequent stability analysis as
qi > 2ι5i, ηc2icxi > 2ι5i + ι2ζN + ηa1i,
2ηa1i + ηa2i > 4ι8 +
2ι2N
ζ
, (20)
where ζ ∈ R is a known positive adjustable constant.
Since the NN function approximation error and the Lips-
chitz constant Lf depend on the compact set that contains
the state trajectories, the compact set needs to be established
before the gains can be selected using (20). Based on the
subsequent stability analysis, an algorithm is developed to
compute the required compact set (denoted by Z) based on
the initial conditions. In Algorithm 1, the notation {̟}i for
any parameter ̟ denotes the value of ̟ computed in the ith
iteration. Since the constants ι and vl depend on Lf only
through the product Lfǫ′i, Algorithm 1 ensures that√
ι
vl
≤ 1
2
diam (Z) , (21)
where diam(Z) denotes the diameter of the set Z .
Theorem 1. Provided Assumption 1 holds and the control
gains satisfy the sufficient conditions in (20), where the
constants in (19) are computed based on the compact set Z
selected using Algorithm 1, the controllers in (9) along with
the adaptive update laws in (12) and (13) ensure that the
state x, the value function weight estimation errors W˜ci and
the policy weight estimation errors W˜ai are UUB, resulting
in UUB convergence of the policies uˆi to the feedback-Nash
equilibrium policies u∗i .
Proof: The derivative of the candidate Lyapunov function
in (17) along the trajectories of (1), (12), and (13) is given by
V˙L =
N∑
i=1

∇xV ∗i

f + N∑
j=1
gjuj




Algorithm 1 Gain Selection
First iteration:
Given an upper bound z ∈ R≥0 on Z (t0) such that ‖Z (t0)‖ <
z, let Z1 ,
{
ξ ∈ R2n+2N
∑
i{pWi}1 | ‖ξ‖ ≤ v−1 (v (z))
}
.
Using Z1, compute the bounds in (19) and select the gains
according to (20). If
{√
ι
vl
}
1
≤ z, set Z = Z1 and terminate.
Second iteration:
If z <
{√
ι
vl
}
1
, let Z2 ,{
ξ ∈ R2n+2N
∑
i{pWi}1 | ‖ξ‖ ≤ v−1
(
v
({√
ι
vl
}
1
))}
.
Using Z2, compute the bounds in (19) and select the gains
according to (20). If
{√
ι
vl
}
2
≤
{√
ι
vl
}
1
, set Z = Z2 and
terminate.
Third iteration:
If
{√
ι
vl
}
2
>
{√
ι
vl
}
1
, increase the number of NN neurons
to {pWi}3 to ensure {Lf}2 {ǫ′i}3 ≤ {Lf}2 {ǫ′i}2 , ∀i =
1, .., N. These adjustments ensure {ι}3 ≤ {ι}2. Set Z ={
ξ ∈ R2n+2N
∑
i{pWi}3 | ‖ξ‖ ≤ v−1
(
v
({√
ι
vl
}
2
))}
and
terminate.
+
N∑
i=1
W˜Tci
(
ηc1iωi
ρi
δˆi +
ηc2i
Mxi
Mxi∑
i=1
ωki
ρki
δˆki
)
− 1
2
N∑
i=1
W˜Tci
(
βiΓ
−1
i − ηc1i
ωiω
T
i
ρ2i
)
W˜ci
−
N∑
i=1
W˜Tai
(
− ηa1i
(
WˆTai − WˆTci
)
− ηa2iWˆTai
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
ηc1iWˆ
T
ci
ωi
ρi
WˆTajσ
′
jGijσ
′T
j
+
1
4
Mxi∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
ηc2i
Mxi
WˆTci
ωki
ρki
WˆTajσ
′ik
j G
ik
ij
(
σ′ikj
)T )
. (22)
Substituting the unmeasurable forms of the BEs from (15) and
(16) into (22) and using the triangle inequality, the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality and Young’s inequality, the Lyapunov
derivative in (22) can be bounded as
V˙ ≤ −
N∑
i=1
qi
2
‖x‖2 −
N∑
i=1
ηc2icxi
2
∥∥∥W˜ci∥∥∥2
−
N∑
i=1
(
2ηa1i + ηa2i
4
)∥∥∥W˜ai∥∥∥2 + N∑
i=1
ι9i
∥∥∥W˜ai∥∥∥
+
N∑
i=1
ι10i
∥∥∥W˜ci∥∥∥− N∑
i=1
(qi
2
− ι5i
)
‖x‖2
−
N∑
i=1
(
ηc2icxi
2
−
(
ι5i +
ι2ζ2N
2
+
ηa1i
2
))∥∥∥W˜ci∥∥∥2
+
N∑
i=1
(
2ηa1i + ηa2i
4
− ι8 − ι2N
2ζ2
)∥∥∥W˜ai∥∥∥2
+ ι3. (23)
Provided the sufficient conditions in (20) hold, completing the
squares in (23), the bound on the Lyapunov derivative can be
expressed as
V˙ ≤ −
N∑
i=1
qi
2
‖x‖2 −
N∑
i=1
ηc2icxi
4
∥∥∥W˜ci∥∥∥2
−
N∑
i=1
(
2ηa1i + ηa2i
8
)∥∥∥W˜ai∥∥∥2 + ι,
< −vl ‖Z‖2 , ∀ ‖Z‖ >
√
ι
vl
. (24)
Using (18), (21), and (24), Theorem 4.18 in [23] can
be invoked to conclude that lim supt→∞ ‖Z (t)‖ ≤
v−1
(
v
(√
ι
vl
))
. Furthermore, the system trajectories are
bounded as ‖Z (t)‖ ≤ Z for all t ∈ R≥0.
The error between the feedback-Nash equilibrium policies
and the approximate policies can be expressed as
‖u∗i − uˆi‖ ≤
1
2
‖Rii‖ giσ′i
(∥∥∥W˜ai∥∥∥+ ǫ¯′i) ,
for all i = 1, .., N , where gi , supx ‖gi (x)‖. Since the
weights W˜ai are UUB, UUB convergence of the approxi-
mate policies to the feedback-Nash equilibrium policies is
obtained.
Remark 1. The closed-loop system analyzed using the can-
didate Lyapunov function in (17) is a switched system. The
switching happens when the least squares regression matrices
Γi reach their saturation bound. Similar to least squares-based
adaptive control (cf. [22]), (17) can be shown to be a common
Lyapunov function for the regression matrix saturation. Since
(17) is a common Lyapunov function, (18), (21), and (24)
establish UUB convergence of the switched system.
V. CONCLUSION
A concurrent learning-based adaptive approach is devel-
oped to determine the feedback-Nash equilibrium solution
to an N -player nonzero-sum game online. The solutions to
the associated coupled HJ equations and the corresponding
feedback-Nash equilibrium policies are approximated using
parametric universal function approximators. Based on the
system dynamics, the Bellman errors are evaluated at a set of
preselected points in the state-space. The value function and
the policy weights are updated using a concurrent learning-
based least squares approach to minimize the instantaneous
BEs and the BEs evaluated at the preselected points.
Unlike traditional approaches that require a PE condition
for convergence, UUB convergence of the value function
and policy weights to their true values, and hence, UUB
convergence of the policies to the feedback-Nash equilib-
rium policies, is established under weaker rank conditions
using a Lyapunov-based analysis. The developed result relies
on a sufficient condition on the minimum eigenvalue of a
time-varying regressor matrix. While this condition can be
heuristically satisfied by choosing enough points, and can be
easily verified online, it can not, in general, be guaranteed
a priori. Furthermore, finding a sufficiently good basis for
value function approximation is, in general, nontrivial and can
be achieved only through prior knowledge or trial and error.
Future research will focus on extending the applicability of
the developed technique by investigating the aforementioned
challenges.
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